Trade Reform, Environment and Intermediation: Implication for Health Standard by Mandal, Biswajit
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trade Reform, Environment and
Intermediation: Implication for Health
Standard
Biswajit Mandal
Department of Economics University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, NY,
USA and Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, India
2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56524/
MPRA Paper No. 56524, posted 9. June 2014 05:50 UTC
    
1 
 
 
 
Trade Reform, Environment and Intermediation: Implication for Health 
Standard 
 
 
Biswajit Mandal* 
Department of Economics 
University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, NY, USA 
and 
Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for Correspondence : 
BISWAJIT MANDAL 
Department of Economics & Politics 
Visva-Bharati University 
Santiniketan, India 
731235 
Telephone: (+91) 03463262751-56 Extn. 405 
E-mail: biswajiteco@gmail.com / bmandal@albany.edu  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*I am thankful to the Planning Unit, Visva-Bharati University for partial financial support. 
Financial support as C V Raman Fellow is also gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Reform, Environment and Intermediation: Implication for Health 
Standard 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Health standard of a region or economy significantly depends on environmental 
quality. And informal sector has a striking role for overall environmental quality as 
sometimes producers prefer not to produce in the formal sector as formal production 
calls for stringent environmental and other governmental regulations. Under such 
circumstances the informal counterpart of the economy becomes heaven for those 
producers who do not want to abide by the rules. Extralegality of informal production, 
by definition, indicates the emergence of intermediation activity. In light of these 
concerns here I build a standard general equilibrium structure to capture these 
phenomena and to focus on the effects of trade reform. It has been shown in this paper 
that tariff reform may lead to greater usage of abatement technology under certain 
factor intensity assumption. However, interestingly, this can not unambiguously ensure 
a better environmental quality in broader sense.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Broadly speaking general health standard and health related problems are 
intertwined with the environmental standard of a country in particular. And on the 
other hand the nexus between trade and environment related issues are in the forefront 
of economic research for quite a long time. Huge numbers of papers are produced 
concerning the world wide panic of environmental degradation that may arise due to 
non-usage of environmentally sound technology of production. Trade theorists more 
often than not look at such concerns from the perspective of globalization. A 
representative sample consists Anderson and Neary (1992), Barrett (1994), Beghin et al 
(1997), Conrad (1993), Copeland (1994), Hoel (1997), Markusen et al (1993), Motta and 
Thisse (1994), Neary (2005), Rauscher (1994, 1997), Ulph (1997), Ulph and Ulph (1996) et 
al. Surprisingly a relatively less attempt (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyaya, 2011; Biswas 
et al, 2012; Chung and Chung, 2012) has been made to analyze an important aspect of 
developing economy in particular and world economy in general, corruption which 
naturally co-exists with trade and environment related problems. Therefore trade and 
environmental issue must have some inference for health standard of an economy 
which is almost a neglected area of research.   
 
A-priori manufacturing production and industrial activities are the principal 
sources of pollution in both developed (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). 
DCs, with higher per capital income, prefer to use different regulatory framework to 
reduce environmental pollution by curbing production units or processes that pay little 
attention to the growing concern of environment. However, the scenario of LDCs are a 
bit different. Although the regulatory framework, its enforcement and the resources 
allocated to comply with legislation are generally limited in LDCs. On top of that 
increasing competition in domestic markets due to liberalization in trade and services 
has forced firms to reduce costs by any means and to upgrade their technologies to 
become more competitive.  
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Conventionally the relationship between environmental protection and private 
costs is quite straight forward, environmental regulations in different forms can only be 
met by additional investments and higher operative costs. Consequently economic 
growth rate is expected to be lowered. Furthermore, taking into account the unequal 
application of environmental regulations in different countries, we observe that a trade-
off between environmental preservation and private competitiveness may often arise. 
 
In this context it is very important to note that many have taken the policy 
implication of the so-called ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC). Poor countries can 
and perhaps grow themselves out of environmental problems rather than tackling them 
with stricter regulation at least for the time being. Critics also mention that the now rich 
countries have become clean at least partly by exporting the dirty production of 
products to other, poorer countries. This implies that the current poor countries will not 
be able to replicate fully this experience. Nevertheless, how some environmental 
policies even in the LDCs can push some firms to an isolated “free” zone where nobody 
is bothered about environment is taken into account in this paper. So use  and non-use 
of abatement technology in production in the LDCs exist simultaneously. We will come 
back to this issue later. 
Before we move to the brief description of the structure and basic results let me 
just put forth the interconnectedness of environment and health in a very simple way. 
Environmental pollution' encompasses the terms environment and pollution. 
Environment is the complete range of external conditions under which an organism 
lives. On the other hand, pollution means to make or render an undesirable change in 
the characteristics of the land, air or water that harmfully effect human life or other 
species. In addition to this, over the last three decades there has been increasing global 
concern over the public health impacts caused by environmental pollution, in 
particular, the global burden of disease. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
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estimates that about a quarter of the diseases that mankind faces today occur due to 
prolonged exposure to environmental pollution. Most of these environment-related 
diseases are however not easily detected and may be acquired during childhood from 
the environment where they are raised and manifested later in adulthood. So the 
detrimental long-run effects of utilization of non-environment friendly technology in 
production on health in general are quite explicit. 
As we mentioned before, sometimes stringent environmental regulation induces 
firms to go beyond the formal setup or sector and to continue production in the 
informal sector1 where environmental strictures are not so binding or non-existent. 
Since informal production itself is not permitted by law, it becomes a happy hunting 
ground for extortionists who actually negotiate between producers and bureaucratic 
officials or government representatives. In exchange of this service they demand 
pecuniary benefit which by definition is DUP activities (Bhagwati, 1982) in nature. This 
paper focuses on such concerns in light of a reformatory trade policies in a general 
equilibrium theoretical model. And subsequently try to look at the possible ill effects on 
health, if any, of a reformatory trade policy. The basic results that I derive here: 
(a) tariff reform may lead to greater usage of abatement technology under certain 
factor intensity assumption; 
(b) a tariff cut can not unambiguously ensure a better environmental quality and 
health standard, per se, in broader sense. 
                                                 
1Informal sector is an important ingredient of the contemporary world economy particularly in the 
developing regions as this segment occupies a formidable chunk of the unskilled labor force. This sector 
covers primarily the non-agricultural employment of unskilled labor. It accounts for 50-80% of total 
employment in South Asia, 30-50% in South East Asia, 40-50% in Africa, 55% in Latin America and 
Caribbean, 24% in Southern Europe, 10% in Western Europe, 18% in Canada and 8% in USA (ILO, 2002) . 
Yet, informal sector’s jobs are not considered as respectable ones. The main derogatory feature of 
informal sector is its extra-legality or illegality by law since it does not conform to government 
regulations.  These units do not abide by labor regulations of the government, and do not pay taxes. In 
fact a large part of it would have vanished if they had to confront government regulations. The paucity of 
legal protection makes the informal sector an easy pray for extortion and corruption. It has been reported 
in Ethiopia that the urban informal sector of this rural country is comprised of almost one million people 
and is vastly distorted with extortion. While Morocco experiences an annual loss of $ 3.6 billion because 
of lack of transparency related extortion/corruption/bribe (Drakard, 2009). 
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The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 builds the basic model and 
talks about the solution mechanism. Effects of tariff reform are discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
There are three goods X, Y and Z produced in the neo-classical framework using 
four factors such as skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (L) and two types of capital (K and 
T). K is perfectly mobile across X and Y but T is specific to Z. X and Y are produced in 
the formal set up whereas Z is produced in the informal set up2. The point to be noted 
very carefully is that the moment producers shift from formal to informal sector they 
are denied the formal capital/credit represented by K. They bank on informal credit, T. 
In addition both X and Y require another intermediate input as abatement technology 
which is not needed in Z. That is the way we bring in informality and environment 
together. Furthermore, S is specific to X and gets Ws as wage. L is mobile between Y 
and Z.  Unskilled labors (L) are unionized in Y. They get   as their wage. K gets 
identical return r across X and Y while T gets R in Z. Who are not fortunate enough to 
work in Y, have to go out of the formal segment. Producers of Z need to comply with 
some institutional and political menace as it is an extra-legal, if not illegal, activity. To 
combat such menace producers obtain service of intermediaries who actually watch out 
for institutional perils. Their marginal productivities in terms of the volume of goods 
are zero though they get positive return for their work3. However, without such an 
arrangement production of Z could not have taken place. We call sector Z as informal 
productive sector. Therefore, in a nutshell production can take place anywhere between 
formal and informal segments. Production in informal sector requires less costly labor 
as  >  but possible return to capital is higher as informal units are not entitled to get 
                                                 
2
 For details about the way we define informal sector see Marjit and Kar (2011). 
 
3
 We can coin this sort of intermediations as directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati, 1982). This is 
the concept of corruption and/or related extortion that we are going to use in our model. 
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loans from legal or government recognized sources. On top of that they need to, 
however, rely on intermediation activity as informal production does not abide by 
environmental regulation. This is reflected by the non-existence of abatement cost and 
existence of cost of intermediation or extortion in form of  in tandem.  resembles an 
ice-berg kind of cost. Therefore the amount lost from Z is entirely spent for employing 
intermediators who actually negotiates with administrators for the survival of 
environment non-friendly sector Z. Intermediation is done only by unskilled labor. Let 
LN be the people and N be the sector representing intermediation/extortion. The return 
to extortionists,  is identical with competitive informal wage, W. Perfect labor 
mobility between Z and N ensures this equality.  
We have a small open economy with competitive markets for production as well 
as for extortions related intermediation or corruption. Competitive corruption market 
implies that the lost output due to intermediation is fully exhausted in paying out 
extortionists. Moreover, we have the standard neo-classical assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and diminishing return to factors. The following set of equations 
describes the model and the interpretations of symbols are usual and well used in trade 
models (Jones, 1965, 1971)4. Further, Y is the importable commodity and subject to a 
tariff t5.  
Competitive commodity market guarantees the following equalities:  
  + 
  +   =                          (1)                                         + 
  +   = 1 +                         (2) 
  +   = 1 −                                          (3)  
                                                 
4
 The symbols that would be used extensively in this paper are:  ⇒ price of the jth commodity ( j= X, Y, Z);  ⇒ 
skilled wage;  ⇒ unskilled formal wage;  ⇒ unskilled informal wage; 
 ⇒ rate of return to K;  ⇒ rate of 
return to T;  ⇒ production requirement of the ith factor in one unit of jth commodity ( i = S,L,K,T and j = X,Y,Z); S ⇒ total supply of skilled labor; L ⇒ total supply of unskilled labor;  ⇒ number of unskilled labor employed in 
extortion; K ⇒ total supply of capital, K; T ⇒ total supply of capital, T. 
 
5
 One can effortlessly disagree to argue that Y should not be the importable commodity for any developing economy 
as it uses unskilled workers. But we do not find any harm in assuming this. Here skilled good (X) is exportable. In 
order to avoid the possibility of complete specialization we have taken the remaining good (Y) as importable. 
Introduction of any other commodity as importable, instead of Y, would not matter much to the basic results of the 
paper. 
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 is the per unit price or cost of abatement technology or cleansing act.  and  
represent how much unit of abatement technology is required to produce one unit of 
environment friendly X and Y respectively.  ,  and  are given and constant. 
Note that,  [ ]1,0∈α ; a low α will mean lower fee of extortion and conversely.  
We have mentioned earlier that N people are paid out of the amount lost from the 
value of Z. And in a competitive set up the value of output lost in Z must be identical to 
the payment made for extortionists. Thus, 
.  . " =         (4) 
Full employment of all the factors ensures the following:  
 . # = $         (5)  . # +  . % = &         (6)  . " = '         (7) . % +  . " =  −        (8) 
We further know that  . # = ( and . % = (. ( and ( represent total amount 
of abatement technology used in X and Y respectively, and C means abatement 
technology together. So  
. # + . % = ( + ( = (      (9) 
Subsequently health standard (H) is a function of environmental quality and thus in 
turn depends on Z which does not abide by environmental regulations. Therefore 
) = *"; *," < 0         (10) 
This completes the structure of the model. Now let us solve for the unknown 
variables. Note that /, ,  , &, ', , $0 are exogenously given and we need to solve for  /, , 
, , #, %, ",  12 (0 from equation (1) - (9). We have nine equations and nine 
unknown variables. Thus the system is solvable.  
 
 
3. EFFECTS OF TARIFF REFORM 
There is no wonder that restrictive trade policies are gradually becoming an issue of 
past. Following WTO negotiation an era of reform has set in and the entire developing 
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world in some form or the other has responded to such transformation. Therefore to 
start with the analysis of trade reform we assume that the government has initiated the 
liberalization strategy and accordingly opted for a tariff cut in the importable sector. 
Following Jones (1965, 1971) and using the Heckscher-Ohlin nugget structure 
(developed in Jones and Marjit 2009) drawing from Gruen and Corden (1970) we can 
easily derive the values of X and Y consequent upon tariff cut. 
#3 = −4 567587 956: ̂ > 0  (as t falls )      (11)   %3 = 4 567587 <67<6: 956: ̂ < 0        (12) 
Using (9) (= = 4 567587 956: ̂ >? <67<6: − ?@     (13) 
Two opposing forces are working for the change in C. As t falls X increases and thus 
demand for and /or use of C rises. Whereas, a reduction Y acts in opposite direction.  
 
Hence 
  (= > 0 A** >? <67<6: − ?@ < 0B
, CD7C67 > CD:C6:  B
, C67C6: < CD7CD: E      (14) 
Therefore, if X uses the abatement technology more intensively than Y, a policy 
of tariff reform leads to more usage of abatement technology in the economy. It can not, 
however, ensure a better environmental situation in the country. Because the moment Y 
falls, it relinquishes some unskilled labor and capital. Capital goes to X and raises the 
production. Labor goes to Z and N simultaneously. Thus if Z goes up, this will pollute 
the environment further. But, if entire labor force gets employed in N, then the extent of 
pollution in the economy will remain unchanged. In what follows we propose that: 
 
PROPOSITIN I: If  
CD7C67 > CD:C6:, tariff reform leads to greater usage of abatement 
technology. 
 
Proof: See discussion above 
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Now let us move to the condition under which Z may rise, fall or remain 
constant. This would help us commenting on the overall quality of the environment and 
quality of health due to reform. Change in the production of either X and Y can not 
influence the quality of environment as both are produced by using environmentally 
sound technology. Whether environmental effect is bad or good that naturally depends 
only on Z. And that consequently determines H. 
Manipulating the system of equations a bit we get 
"= = $#3 + $%3 + $9 F%3 + ̂G       (15) 
"= > 0 A**  $ > :HI7 587567 56:9 + $ + $9  <67<6:  
where, $ = J.KLJ.MN. and $ = J.KLJ.MN. and  $9= 9J.KLJ.MN.. 
It is apparent from (15) that if the share of expenditure coming from X is 
sufficiently large, environmental quality of the economy would be worse off. The 
economic underpinning is as follows: since X expands and Y shrinks, the change in 
demand for Z is uncertain. Along with it as t falls the effective price of Y also falls 
indicating a less income from Y that can be spent on Z. Negative demand effect on Z is 
two-pronged: one for less production of Y and other for less price of Y. Hence 
equilibrium supply of Z will increase if and only if the share of X is sufficiently large to 
outweigh the negative demand effect generated from Y. Hence the following 
proposition is immediate. 
 
PROPOSITIN II: Overall environmental quality and health standard will be degraded if 
$ > :HI7 587567 56:9 + $ + $9  <67<6:.       
 
Proof: See discussion above 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have developed a general equilibrium model of trade where both formal 
and informal sector exist in tandem. Tight environmental guidelines lead to the 
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emergence of informal sector which crucially hinges upon the intermediation done by 
extortionists. These people, essentially, make the informal production possible. It has 
been shown here that a policy of tariff cut may induce greater usage of abatement 
technology. However, the environmental quality and the health standard of the country 
may be worsened under a certain condition. 
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